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Narratives of legitimacy include the 
highest-level justifications for states 
and regimes, narratives of divine right, 
narratives of electoral or democratic 
affirmation, narratives of conquest, na-
rratives of historical entitlement. These 
narratives can seem solid and eternal 
yet history shows they are fragile and 
ephemeral, that they can vanish in a 
day. They are the product of myth, of 
past achievement and often of inter-
national accord and consensus. Shifts 
can come from changing global values, 
from economic pressure, from ideologi-
cal challenge from outside or out, from 
dissent, or from improbable moments 
of mass conversion. Narratives of legi-
timacy —and their alternatives— are 
nourished by competing groups —for 
example, supporters of a regime (be 
they stakeholders or merely conserva-
tives) and its long-term opponents 
(both domestic and foreign). Trans-
formations come from changes in the 
state’s own telling of its story, both at 
home and globally, and from the in-
creasing role of other major players in 
accepting, fashioning or rejecting justi-
ficatory narratives. Failing states —tho-
se without any convincing narrative of 
Els discursos de legitimitat contenen al-
tíssims nivells de justificació dels estats i 
dels règims; discursos de dret diví, discur-
sos de reafirmació electoral o democràti-
ca, discursos de conquesta, discursos de 
drets històrics. Aquests discursos poden 
semblar sòlids i perpetus, tot i que la his-
tòria evidencia que són fràgils i efímers i 
es poden esvair d’un dia per l’altre. Són 
fruit del mite, d’esdeveniments passats 
i, molt sovint, d’acords internacionals o 
del consens. Els seus canvis es deuen a 
la transformació dels valors globals, la 
pressió econòmica, els reptes ideològics 
interns i externs, la dissidència o bé a 
improbables situacions de conversions 
en massa. Els discursos de legitimitat —i 
les seves variants— són alimentats per 
grups contraris, com ara els defensors 
d’un règim, ja sigui la classe dominant 
o conservadora, i els seus rivals seculars, 
tant interns com forans. Les transfor-
macions apareixen per canvis de posició 
des del propi estat, ja sigui en clau inter-
na o global, i també pel paper creixent 
d’altres actors principals amb força su-
ficient per acceptar, conformar o rebut-
jar aquests discursos de justificació. Els 
estats no reeixits —els que no disposen 
d’un discurs convincent de legitimitat— 
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10 legitimacy— may use coercive speech 
restrictions to protect themselves from 
criticism or insult or other methods of 
undermining them.
Key words: legitimacy, democracy, ima-
gery, regulation, free speech.
poden imposar restriccions en el dret 
d’expressió per tal de protegir-se de la 
crítica, les ofenses o d’altres vies d’atac.
Paraules clau: legitimitat, democràcia, 
imatges, regulació, llibertat d’expressió.
A state is, in part, a collection of stories connected to power. Remembered traditions, obligations and laws —all stories in themselves— shape inter-nal and external perceptions of a state and the range of its efficacy. But 
the collection of stories that define the state changes and transforms. Within the 
bandwidth of circumstances we might call reality, it is important to understand 
who manufactures such stories and what levers of control are deployed in their 
diffusion. Viable states fight to manage and limit the process of narrative trans-
formation. A sense of loss of state power intensifies when significant aspects of 
self-characterization fall out of national control: when, for example, a state or its 
leadership change in the global imagination from moral hero to delegitimated 
villain, from keeper of ideals to perpetrator of evil, from agent of desirable stabi-
lity to vessel for potential protest and disorder, or from representative of financial 
reliability to economic profligate. Because narratives are part of the mythic ar-
chitecture of the state, how they are produced, and with what consequences, be-
comes an important part of understanding state power, regime stability, and the 
interactions between local and global processes and structures. The shaping of 
these narratives is a product of the discursive environments in which the state is 
understood, influenced by everyday speech and strategic communications. Idea-
tional entrepreneurs will compete with states to enrich epistemic communities 
that sustain and legitimize policy ideas.1 Outside states and other major groups 
(NGOs, rival political entities, etc.) have a stake, often quite a desperate one, in 
how these narratives are framed. And the effort to control such narratives both 
draws on and challenges the ideas of “free expression,” or the rights to receive 
and impart information. The daily dramas, the bold adventures and frequent tra-
gedies of free expression take place against the background of intense, large-scale 
maneuvering over which narrative dominates. The result —domestic or inter-
national efforts to affect this process— leverages speech out with the context of 
formal legal constraints, challenging understandings of “the right” itself. 
In this chapter, I focus on the interaction among strategic communicators to 
create a particular kind of “strategic narrative,” namely what I call “narratives 
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of legitimacy”. Narratives of legitimacy include the highest-level justifications 
for states and regimes, narratives of divine right, narratives of electoral or demo-
cratic affirmation, narratives of conquest, narratives of historical entitlement. 
These narratives can seem solid and eternal yet history shows they are fragile and 
ephemeral, that they can vanish in a day. They are the product of myth (e.g. of 
birthright, or of manifest destiny), of past achievement (e.g. of imperial glory) 
and often of international accord and consensus (such as the partition of Korea, 
which is alien to those in the North). Shifts can come from changing global 
values, from economic pressure, from ideological challenge from outside or out, 
from dissent, or from improbable moments of mass conversion. Narratives of 
legitimacy —and their alternatives— are nourished by competing groups —for 
example, supporters of a regime (be they stakeholders or merely conservatives) 
and its long-term opponents (both domestic and foreign)—. Transformations 
come from changes in the state’s own telling of its story, both at home and 
globally, and from the increasing role of other major players in accepting, fas-
hioning or rejecting justificatory narratives. Failing states —those without any 
convincing narrative of legitimacy— may use coercive speech restrictions to pro-
tect themselves from criticism or insult or other methods of undermining them. 
Regimes strive to maintain or deepen their narratives of legitimacy against 
global efforts to redefine them in many ways. Traditions of legitimacy are attac-
ked and new narratives are set against them. Typically, states engage in strategic 
communication to attack or reinforce these narratives of legitimacy. Often the 
theater of performance is global, not national and, as a result, the ordinary tools, 
including the language of censorship, are less effective. The narrative of legitima-
cy is hardly ever the exclusive domain of the state to which it pertains, though 
the romance of it would say otherwise. Strategic narratives and the struggle to 
affect them are usually a remnant of classic diplomatic efforts. They are normally 
attempts at the highest government levels to arrange an understanding of scena-
rios, moving forward. But, simultaneously, other players —the “street”, the “so-
ciety”, the crowd, often using social media— fight to intervene in the process of 
narrative management, creating additional challenges for governments. A new 
dynamic arises as use of social media critically interacts with efforts by world 
leaders to fashion and influence strategic narratives.
A narrative of legitimacy that gains regional and international approval has 
not only symbolic value but can reduce costs, for example, of defense or avoi-
dance of sanctions. Each period, in modern times, sees its own struggles to va-
lidate narratives of legitimacy based in prevailing political consensus or recent 
historical events. In the 1990s, the redefinition of the post-Soviet states required 
assertion and protection of new formulations based on free market capitalism 
and parliamentary democracy. The dissolution of Yugoslavia led to extraordi-
nary conflicts and international intervention to help define and defend certain 
narratives of legitimacy concerning ethnicity, self-government, and the limits of 
regional integration. What narratives drove Kosovar independence, for example, 
or the federation of Serbia, what would Bosnia and Herzegovina look like had dif-
ferent narratives prevailed? In Africa, the processes of legitimation and delegiti-
mation continue in the post-colonial period. Secessionist entities like Somaliland 
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12 exist and function though without international recognition, yet have a strong 
internal narrative of functionality. In Sudan, civil war gave way to plebiscite and 
the nervous creation of South Sudan as separatism gained legitimacy as a poli-
tical solution. A successful narrative produces “loyalty,” a quality explored by 
Albert O. Hirschman in his work as one which raises the price of “exit” or non-
participation by citizens and subjects in the functions of the state.2
States scramble to find techniques, international negotiation, economic and 
diplomatic clout to maintain conditions of legitimacy. But narrative plays a sig-
nificant role. They suppress dissent, produce propaganda, nourish histories (fal-
se and true), use the levers of policy, of sanction and reward, all in the service 
of such narratives. Narratives are interlaced with power. A successful narrative 
(internally or externally) may lubricate power, underwrite power, mask power. 
A narrative may momentarily mesmerize, but not be sufficient to hold sway. 
Thus, fateful episodes of post-Soviet transitions, of the 2011 Arab Spring, of the 
European economic crises and reinventions of African states, frequently solid in 
their apparent hold, dissolve into mockeries of themselves with challenges in 
these areas. 
Transformations are significant in an international context. An enduring and 
successful narrative can hold a coalition together, maintain investment confi-
dence, foster a resolution to a divisive conflict, and encourage collective dedica-
tion to a politically viable outcome. Narratives, of course, can be destructive as 
well as rehabilitating; they can be used to move a society towards a more demo-
cratic practice, but also to destructive ends, for example, through one of the most 
terrifyingly successful narratives of our time, to fascism. 
Narratives aNd strategy
This process of creating and sustaining basic justificatory mythologies can be 
understood through the expanding literature on strategic narratives. “Strategic 
narratives” is a term that has been resuscitated and burnished in the last several 
years as a more specific and narrower element of strategic communication. Nar-
ratives are “frameworks constructed to allow people to make sense of the world, 
policies, events, and interactions,”3 Ben O’Loughlin defines strategic narratives 
as those forged by a state with several purposes, including “with the express 
purpose of influencing the foreign policy behavior of other actors”4 —a form of 
narrative much more coercive than simply national storytelling. Niels Röling 
and Marleen Maarleveld take a longer view of the function of narratives. They 
rely on Giddens (1987) and his notion of “double hermeneutics” to clarify how 
stories, images, theories, slogans, and axioms are woven together, become widely 
shared, and dominate behavior.
Single hermeneutics refers to the act of making sense of objects and events. For example, 
Copernicus, the 16th Century Polish astronomer, established that the earth is not the cen-
ter of the universe. Instead, the earth is a rather insignificant planet turning around the 
sun. Double hermeneutics refers to the fact that sense making by some can affect the sense 
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making and behavior of others. In other words, whether people believe the earth turns 
around the sun or vice versa does not affect the behavior of these celestial bodies. But the 
way people make sense of the world can certainly affect the sense making of others.5
As Röling and Maarleveld put it, “Widely shared narratives are constructed that 
influence individual sense making by highlighting and legitimating some op-
tions and making invisible others... [S]trategic narratives shape social relations 
by determining our expectations about other people’s behavior. Social relations 
produce structure and structure produces social relations”.6 As a result, “So-
cial science can be as powerful as natural science because it can equally affect 
people’s sense making. It is not the power of its predictions that give social —or 
any— science its influence, but the extent to which its perspectives or narratives 
take hold of people’s imagination and enthusiasm, and especially the extent to 
which that sense making begins to justify policies and shape enduring practices, 
institutional design, and the use of natural resources and ecological services”. In 
this sense, “narrative” must be separated from merely observing the world and 
recording what is observed. Narrative is interpretive, not merely, or necessarily 
objective. This potential gap between narrative as myth and narrative as repre-
sentation of the world is the basis for its strategic significance.
When it comes to those elements that make narrative strategic, Laura Roselle 
captures a helpful logic. She cites Freedman, a forerunner of strategic narrative 
theory, who has argued that narratives are “compelling story lines which can 
explain events convincingly and from which inferences can be drawn”.7 Like 
O’Loughlin, Roselle distinguishes “narratives” from “stories” and discourages 
using the terms interchangeably. “The structure of stories implies a temporality 
—a movement through time— suggesting a link to the past (history), a purpose 
or meaning, and a conclusion, lesson, or proscription for the future. Stories have 
been and are important to people as conceptual organizing tools that allow indi-
viduals to understand one another within a particular context”.8 For Roselle, “[w]
hat makes such efforts ‘narratives’ instead of plain ‘stories,’ domestic ‘spin,’ or 
‘propaganda’ is the fact that they are less retrospective explanations than they are 
forward-looking conceptual frameworks for explaining and interpreting events 
yet to come”.9 Narratives are different, as well, from “framing” exercises, as they 
are based on future behavior rather than simply on aiding understanding. Narra-
tives “attempt to follow a certain self-referential logic which must string together 
a host of events, pose a causal relationship between them, and then use this to 
hypothesize about the best way forward to success”.10
For Freedman, narratives “are strategic because they do not arise spontaneously 
but are deliberately constructed or reinforced out of the ideas and thoughts that 
are already current”11 This is similar to the idea that “[n]arratives are composed for 
particular audiences at moments in history, and they draw on taken-for granted 
discourses and values circulating in a particular culture”.12 In an important essay, 
Antoniades, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin address “narrative work great powers 
undertake to establish and maintain influence in the international system and 
shape the system itself”.13 The function of these narratives is to extend influence, 
manage expectations and change the discursive environment. Strategic narrati-
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14 ves take the actors’ understandings of international politics, gather them into 
intelligible patterns, traditions and ideologies, and connect apparently unconnec-
ted phenomena around some causal transformation. While storylines are “sense-
making” and organizational, “narrative” can be distinguished, these writers say, 
in that they take an initial situation or order, identify a problem that disrupts 
that order, and produce a resolution that reestablishes or has the anticipation of 
restoring order. For Hajer, the “key function of storylines is that they suggest uni-
ty in the bewildering variety of separate discursive component parts of a policy 
problem,”14 but still the additional measure of consensus or agreement or power 
is necessary so that the storyline becomes strategically functional. The objective 
—what makes a story a strategic narrative in international relations— is the im-
plicit inclusion of a “tacit set of rules” as Antoniades, et al put it, “for how foreign 
policy actors are to perform in certain speech situations and articulate responses 
to policy challenges and problems”.15
Archetti enlarges the lens from state actors to non-state actors: “Narratives 
are central to the practice of international relations. Governments use narratives 
strategically to achieve desired objectives: defining their countries’ identities, ex-
plaining their role in the world, identifying allies and enemies, establishing the 
nature of the relationships among them; contextualizing historical events, as 
well as policy decisions.” But, as she points out, “the context in which contem-
porary international relations take place... is not characterized by the interaction 
among states only. Access to global communications has empowered... states, 
NGOs, corporate actors, transnational actors, even private citizens [all of whom] 
have acquired a voice (Valencic, 2001)”.16 The possibility of communicating ins-
tantaneously with global audiences across distances at almost no cost gives non-
state actors both visibility and the power, to different extents, to influence the 
conduct of international politics. Indeed, “these actors might not have substan-
tial financial, material or military resources, yet through the persuasive power 
of strategic narratives can mobilize audiences across national borders (Douglas 
2007; Betz 2008)”.17 Thus we see the stage is set for the increasing proliferation 
of strategic narratives, as social media users and NGOs empowered by strategic 
communication seek to utilize their power.
Archetti reminds the reader of the complexity with which the various narra-
tive inputs are received, particularly in light of new technologies. Using a me-
taphor of differentially placed mirrors in the field through which a narrative is 
refracted, Archetti asserts that “the position within the social field will affect the 
orientation of each individual’s mirror [and...][t]he position also affects where 
(to which people) the image is going to be further reflected to. Network analysts 
would say this depends on the ties the individual has with the broader network 
(Brown 2009)”.18 Thus, control lapses over the formation, projection and recep-
tion of the strategic narrative. The new media ecology means, as Antoniades et 
al. put it, more potential to re-evaluate, disrupt and re-inscribe historical events 
—that is, to change the narrative. Archetti resists “reification of the narrative, the 
belief that it has an objective existence outside the mind of audiences— a notion 
that clashes with the understanding of narrative as a social product only existing 
through its continuous re-telling”.19
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strategic Narratives iN actioN
In this essay, I focus on a subset of narratives of legitimacy, mildly modifying 
the definitions within this family of possibilities. Consistent with this book’s 
emphasis on strategies of communication, I focus on narratives that have a cer-
tain kind of strategic pedigree. They are usually the consequence of an external 
international agreement (formal or tacit). The agreement contemplates actions 
that enact a transformative drama of governance. The international parties seek 
to assure that the story predicted by the narrative will take place, and threaten 
consequences if they do not. I have selected these criteria because they reflect, in 
some manner, principal recent transnational struggles to invent or construct ap-
proaches that will resolve conflict or crisis, where the ongoing reinvention of the 
polity is an important and vital part of an emerging reality. My approach to this 
understanding of strategic narratives is informed by the events of the Arab Spring 
and other critical transnational episodes that touch on governmental legitimacy. 
There, in episode after episode, elements of the international community (NATO, 
the Arab League, the UN, and individual states in shifting combinations), sought 
to fashion scenarios, cease-fires, truces, and negotiated agreements that would 
alter existing political arrangements and create a new platform for governance.  
These narratives sought to introduce scripts with discipline for different ac-
tors playing different roles, scripts with consequences for non-adherence. These 
were not always successful, and they required, of course, cooperation from in-
ternal warring parties as well as the government itself. In their implied coercion, 
strategic narratives are akin to law —or at least aspire in that direction—. Narra-
tives are strategic as they perform the functions that scripts play in conventional 
theater, namely to bind actors to roles or set an approximate trajectory; to hold 
the actors (with wild differences based on authorial or directorial perquisites) to 
more or less expected ways of behaving. Strategic narratives, in this sense, are 
exceptional. They purport to pull key participants within their sweep, not only 
those who were the architects or writers of the script but also those, involuntarily 
bound, who can affect whether the script will be successful in its overall perfor-
mance. Narratives that are strategic are anthems to the future of the state. They 
must be related to history, but also illuminate future paths. Strategic narratives 
may (and often do) incorporate a brokered solution among parties. They incor-
porate the resolution within a larger mythology designed to suppress, at least 
momentarily, internal divisions, and create a momentum for moving forward. 
The practicalities of compromise are significant. The strategic narratives I discuss 
impose additional conditions and assure dramatic sequences that satisfy the in-
ternational community that one more crisis is at least temporarily thwarted.  
Of course, the Arab Spring was a concatenation of strategic narratives, seeking 
to be effective. The Dayton Accords contained within them a strategic narrative 
for the Balkans, one in which a series of states would glided toward European 
Union membership or association and an international protectorate, temporarily 
in control, dissolved into a sequence of more or less democratic entities. So too 
did the Oslo Accords for Israel and Palestine: the narrative of a two state solution 
built on UN resolutions. Each episode had the potential for success, each for 
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16 failure. Each was dependent on parties to agree to terms. But each had an overri-
ding dramatic element —a transcendent vision designed to overcome otherwise 
incontrovertible obstacles—. Not all strategic narratives are embedded in con-
sensual documents to which parties, internal and external, have agreed —the 
drive towards the Iraq war, for example, was incredibly contested, yet produced a 
script which, if obligations were not met and roles not adhered to, meant war—.
a taxoNomy of Legitimacy Narratives
Looking at the recent embodiments of narratives of legitimacy, the following 
model may clarify the argument. Narratives of legitimacy are “strategic” in the 
sense I have suggested if:
• The new narrative has gained consensus among key international actors (con-
sensus-based narrative) or, 
• In lieu of consensus among such actors, was deemed binding because of the 
power held by the maker or collaborative makers of the narrative (power-based 
narrative), or
• In lieu of such external power, had such narrative strength in an aesthetic of 
interpretation that it became an (or the) accepted version of what should occur 
(self-generating narrative). 
I explore, below, a consideration that applies to all three: whether, in an age 
of social media, the narrative must be in harmony with changing narrative of 
power “in the street”. 
Each configuration has its examples —and most instances partake imperfectly 
of all three—. Take the first —an agreed-upon approach among key international 
actors that accompanies or precedes an action—. This does not mean, necessa-
rily, a reenactment of a Yalta-like event with powers (in this case through Stalin, 
Roosevelt and Churchill) formally meeting and coming to a complex understan-
ding. It may be an agreement that is formed by a series of diffuse policy state-
ments, slowly emerging over time, explicitly or by nods and winks. Such a narra-
tive is designed to build consensus among domestic or international publics. The 
narrative might be an accurate portrayal of why a decision to act was taken, or 
of what is planned or proposed as a course of action coherent with the past; but 
a strategic narrative need not and often is not fully accurate in its depiction or 
understanding of reality. Because the function of the narrative is to achieve and 
build consensus, transparency and credibility are often critical, but it is primarily 
for that (excellent) reason of furthering support that accuracy and truth-telling 
is a factor. It is a matter of prudence and efficacy rather than principle. What is 
significant —and hard to achieve— is for key actors to agree the narrative and 
bind those that they have influence over. 
In the second case, power, not consensus, legitimates. Power creates the illusion 
of consensus, but it is often illusion that undergirds the strategic narrative in the 
first instance. Understanding power is central to understanding why the narrative 
takes on its particular guise. Strategic narratives based on power were characteristic 
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of the Cold War period, where, for example, Warsaw Pact countries followed a So-
viet lead. Or in contemporary times where a superpower is a reality, where narrati-
ves invented in Washington —one might think of Iraq or the ‘War on Terror’ more 
generally— are subscribed to elsewhere. One might quibble, arguing that where it 
is power that does the work, the nature of the strategic narrative is less important. 
But we have seen that regardless of the extent of power, a strategic narrative helps 
in consensus building and maintaining the legitimacy of power. 
The third case may be closest to what might be called a “pure” strategic narra-
tive: where it is the compelling nature of the narrative itself that serves to marshal 
support and agreement among key players and key publics. This could be strategic 
narrative by epiphany, or strategic narrative by the most artful understanding of the 
needs of contending participants. It might be strategic narratives that are based on 
religious fervor, where the emotional consensus-building elements for the signifi-
cant participants are already present. “Democratization” sometimes takes the form 
of such a “pure” narrative, where the idea of a common desire for more democratic 
practices is thought to work its own mobilizing magic —although we should note 
that this was how the Iraq War narrative was presented, underlining the power 
of this third type, a naturalized narrative aspired to by those who otherwise work 
through power or consensus—. After Tunisia, a default narrative arose —a narra-
tive of liberation— which seemed to affect the complex environment of ordinary 
compromise and political arrangement. The restoration of an Islamic caliphate is 
another charismatic form of conferring legitimacy. Pure narratives can be the most 
compelling. Such narratives permeate networks and gain adherents. These narrati-
ves persist, often, in the face of shifting attitudes of political actors and may have 
greater endurance in the face of the use of force. This compelling narrative which 
is “aesthetic” and self-generating, and can be entirely detached from power and 
consensus, indeed could counter both. 
In all three cases a narrative can fail at its strategic purpose. The narrative can 
carry emotion, build consensus and still fail, as I have indicated earlier in this 
chapter. Failure, with accompanying Schadenfreude, is frequent enough that it 
too must be analyzed. Key actors may, for one reason or another, depart from 
an explicit or implicit agreement and their consensus cannot be enforced. States 
fall out with other states. Disclosures or new information, or changing facts on 
the ground, may make the narrative no longer tenable. A strategic narrative may 
be dependent on representations of the real world that no longer have credibi-
lity (we can think, for example, of the loss of legitimacy suffered by the United 
States upon the revelation of no WMDs in Iraq). The publics that narratives were 
designed to influence may turn out to be resistant and rejecting. And an account 
that seemed an epiphany, or a narrative that transcended current divisions and, 
in itself, deepened loyalties and allegiance, can be washed away in a moment of 
mass transformation. In Egypt and in rebel Libya the potential for such disinte-
gration of the strategic narrative was always present. In Egypt, the international 
narrative of peaceful transition was and continues to be threatened by the sustai-
ning role of the military, violence against civilians, and the lingering ambitions 
and sense of entitlement of the old guard. In Libya, to the extent the international 
community’s narrative was built on the premise that there were rebels capable of 
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18 gaining control, the regaining of ground by loyalists, persistence of a stalemate, 
errors by NATO forces, disarray in rebel ranks —all of these posed momentary 
and recurring problems for the strategic narrative—. The romance of the narrative 
might persist, but no longer with its disciplining force.  
The process of delegitimation, like that of affirmatively building a new narra-
tive, should be analyzed in similar terms. Delegitimation of the old (Mubarak, 
Assad, Gadhafi, Saleh) has elements of consensus and rewriting or reconceptua-
lizing history, and is a critical part of informing a new narrative, but it should 
be differentiated from the process of advancing alternative or competing nar-
ratives. Delegitimating may be a prerequisite;  yet it will often be much easier 
than creating an alternative. The delegitimating function may be effective, while 
the strategy for a replacing narrative falls short. In the Arab Spring cases —and 
others— delegitimation efforts may be largely directed inwards. Efforts to sup-
port protestors in Tahrir Square or Syrian demonstrators in Homs (delegimitating 
the government) were accompanied by an international effort to bolster those 
pushing for a new or altered set of resolution-oriented conditions. The legitima-
ting and delegitimating function of a narrative may be highly correlated, or the 
two approaches may different constellations internationally dealing with diffe-
rent constituencies or targets with somewhat different strategies.  
The Arab Spring illustrated how various forums might exist for the playing 
out of these contests over narratives. They are a complex mix between interven-
tions from international actors (seeking, competitively) to create and extend a 
strategic narrative,  and  liberation ideologies or other manifestations of histo-
rical momentum from below. The forums for strategic narratives have included 
the Arab League (Syria and Libya), the UN Security Council (Libya), NATO (in the 
case of Libya) and the EU. But one can think more broadly. Efforts to enhance or 
solidify particular narratives of legitimacy for Palestine (in one form or another) 
are accompanied by efforts to delegitimatize Israel (or to reinforce the Palestinian 
Authority as compared to Hamas). Each process or element may have its own 
distinct set of target audiences, its own set of strategic allies, its own methods for 
furthering the likelihood of the desired outcome being achieved.  Delegitimation 
may take place on the assumption that a new, particular narrative of legitimacy 
will emerge, but instead the replacing form may take a form unanticipated by 
the delegitimatizers.
strategic Narratives iN the arab spriNg
Two instances, early in the Arab Spring, underscore the interplay between stra-
tegic narratives and legitimacy and set the tone for what came afterwards. By 
February and March 2011, an informal consensus had emerged in Western capi-
tals: Hosni Mubarak would have to resign, as would Colonel Gaddafi. In those 
months both Mubarak and Saif Gaddafi, the Colonel’s favored son, rather than 
accept the narrative, sought to resist. Each held the illusion that he could pro-
pound an alternate vision, each through the vehicle of a speech to a national and 
global audience, leading in both cases to a hostile reaction —swift and relatively 
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bloodless in the instance of Egypt, and long and costly in the instance of Libya—. 
These examples show the strong impact a strategic narrative can have, forcing 
actors into roles and laying out consequences for non-compliance.
When Mubarak, then still Egypt’s long-reigning authoritarian President, 
spoke, on what turned out to be his last public speech in his official capacity 
(on February 10, 2011),20 he varied from the international narrative for chan-
ge, one likely brokered between Washington and  the Egyptian military. It had 
been widely anticipated that Mubarak would make generous obeisance to the 
protestors at Tahrir Square, recognize the importance of the rising civil society, 
speak respectfully of processes of fundamental change, and gracefully announce 
a purposive set of practices for shuffling off the political stage.21 Instead, he gave 
a somewhat angry, defensive speech in which he emphasized the ways he would 
continue to control the levers of power rather than merely summarily disappear. 
The reaction among the Egyptian military, the protestors in the street, and the 
international policy world in Europe and the United States was virtually unani-
mous. Mubarak had blundered badly; he had violated expectations in some fun-
damental way. Within 24 hours, he resigned.  
In Egypt, a strategic narrative seemed to have been virtually negotiated, with 
the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton appointing a Special Representative to con-
vey the U.S. determination, then personally asserting an anticipated result, and 
the U.S. military leadership (in concert, undoubtedly, with European counter-
parts) pronouncing a prospective outcome to the Egyptian command. In Libya, 
the initial efforts were equally dramatic. By April 2011, the fate of Libya’s current 
“narrative of legitimacy” was sealed. U.S. President Barack Obama, UK Prime 
Minister David Cameron of the UK and French President Nicolas Sarkozy wrote a 
joint letter for global public consumption (the letter was addressed to the The Ti-
mes of London, The International Herald Tribune and Le Figaro). The letter was a sig-
nificant example of forming and promulgating a strategic narrative —and doing 
so not through a formal organization or classic agreement—. For “a transition 
to succeed, Colonel Gaddafi must go, and go for good. At that point, the United 
Nations and its members should help the Libyan people as they rebuild where 
Gaddafi has destroyed —to repair homes and hospitals, to restore basic utilities, 
and to assist Libyans as they develop the institutions to underpin a prosperous 
and open society—. This vision for the future of Libya has the support of a broad 
coalition of countries, including many from the Arab world”.22 The three leaders 
had announced that a narrative of legitimacy that included Colonel Gaddafi in a 
position of leadership was unsustainable.
The international narratives in Egypt and Libya had expectations built into 
them, expectations of what the leaders would do and before that, what they 
would say. For those proclaiming such narratives, some kind of sense (at least 
temporary sense), had been made of the world; and mechanisms were put in place 
to enforce them. It was expected that even actors not fully party to the narrative’s 
construction would see the light and, if at all possible, conform. These strategic 
narratives were not quite “law,” though they were designed to regulate behavior. 
They were not quite contracts and, as the Egypt and Libya case show, they may 
not have had the necessary acquiescence by those who were key players.
MONROE E. PRICE
TR
ÍP
O
D
O
S 
20
12
   
|  
 3
0
20 These examples begin to demonstrate the consequences of shifts in narratives 
of legitimacy. A delegitimated regime has altered status in the international com-
munity. The consequence might be sanctions, more difficult access to zones of 
discourse, weakening influence in international bodies, or all-out regime change. 
Delegitimation has important consequences internally. For domestic citizens, the 
promise of protest, the values of adherence to Rule of Law, the level of general 
obedience and loyalty, the willingness to fight —all this is affected by rejection 
of elements of a consensual narrative of legitimacy and a shift to a new one—.
When Mubarak faced the microphones and gave ‘the wrong speech,’ he was 
defying —perhaps consciously— the narrative of positive social change and gra-
dual but significant transfer of power. That latter approach was a narrative that 
had an arc —from protests in Tahrir Square to a promise of a new election process, 
a new generation of involved citizens, and a more democratic outcome—. In the 
face of his actions, there were elements of all three ingredients I listed: consensus 
among key international actors, grounded in power, with a high-concept drama 
that had transcendent qualities. And the international narrative was synchronous, 
or seemed to be, with internal developments. Not only was the narrative about the 
future of Egypt, it was an outcome of intense discussions among Western govern-
ments and with the Arab League, as well as a reflection of the power of the street. 
As a result it had sufficient impetus behind it (though there were those, such as 
the Saudis, who disagreed intensely with elements of the narrative) to function in 
strategic form. Finally, the narrative had a romantic appeal —it was the playing out 
of a dream, echoing the events of 1989 in terms of its aesthetic power—.
The example of Libya was more complicated and more telling. When protests 
spread to Libya, the processes for intervention, the parties to intervention and 
the justification for intervention were each highly disputed. It was necessary to 
find a strategic narrative that created the umbrella for joint action and defined or 
maintained the limits of collaboration. The strategic narrative had to negotiate a 
carefully-defined goal (protecting civilians from their own government, reducing 
the numbers of civilian deaths and, more controversially, removal of Gaddafi from 
power); a technique (no-fly zone versus degrees of other forms of combat interven-
tion); and provide a motivating drama that would build consensus (increasingly a 
mix of stories of torture, rape, delusion, irresponsible wealth, over-maintenance of 
power and lack of democratic institutions). Consistent with my earlier definitions, 
the strategic narrative needed to be credible but it did not need fully to represent 
the complexities of the real. And it did not need to dictate day-to-day conduct, just 
the general roles of the actors. It will long be debated how exactly the strategic nar-
rative concerning Libya shifted, so subtle were the nuances of what was expressed 
and what was not, which elements were contained within the UN resolution and 
which were not. The expressed broad-based strategic narrative (and the UN resolu-
tion) stopped short of explicitly requiring the ouster of Gaddafi, but the principal 
powerful actors included that with their own articulations of preferred outcomes. 
As with Egypt, much of the Libyan experience must be seen in terms of a long-
standing public relations initiative —serving the status quo— that heightened the 
sense of abandonment and betrayal. For example, consider Saif, in February 2011. In 
the days before the speech, in the moments before it was delivered, the default na-
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rrative he considered likely was transition —and transition into Saif’s hands—. The 
son had been trained for this moment —trained for reform at the London School of 
Economics where he received a PhD and was assumed to have been handpicked to 
guide Libya to a more democratic, civil society-based future—. He may have meant 
at one point, to enact that narrative, but, as part of a ceremony of recalcitrance, he 
fully and devastatingly failed, a failure manifested in the media accounts of infor-
mal and formal Western government reaction. “We will keep fighting until the last 
man standing, even to the last woman standing,” Saif said, “We will not leave Libya 
to the Italians or to the Turks ... Our spirits are high.” Speaking of the rebels, “They 
now want to transform Libya into a group of [Islamic] emirates —small states— 
and even [cause] separatism. They have a plot. Unfortunately, our brother Arabs 
[allowed] their media, their stations and the inflammatory coverage”.23
One caveat: in presenting this definition of strategic narratives, I do not mean 
to underplay what could be called the revolutionary dynamics, the protests, the 
internal mobilizations, the effective interrelationships between crowds and glo-
bal audiences. It would be a mistake to overemphasize the role of the elite over 
the masses, the role of the “international community” over the dynamics within 
each state. Almost always, a catalyst for the West to emphasize the importance 
of deposing leaders stepping down came from protest and rebel power respec-
tively), and a realization the countries were at a “tipping point,” and often (in 
Egypt especially), a desire to be on ‘the right side’ of history. In this sense, the 
“strategic narrative” of the events in Egypt influenced the United States as much 
as they did Mubarak. This narrative though, is more disembodied, comes from a 
mix of popular unrest, international pressure, worldwide support through social 
media, and, after Tunisia, a sort of blueprint of the way things would go.
Narratives of Legitimacy aNd sociaL media
I indicated earlier that each attempt at narrative by actors in the international com-
munity would be affected by what transpired in the “social media.” What pressure 
does use of social media place on the capacity of elite international players to esta-
blish either a controlling framework or a consensus-based narrative of legitimacy? 
O’Loughlin et al ask whether the rise of digital innovations will mean significant 
changes in the structuring and functioning of strategic narratives.24 Consideration 
of strategic narratives and their impact began in an era of more conventional media, 
when leaders had greater capacity (or at least considered that they did) to control 
messages and their diffusion, or to shape opinion about a narrative. The Arab Spring 
reinforced the idea that top-level development of strategic narratives is supplemen-
ted and altered as the use of new technologies become effective; a broader public, 
and an unstructured, crowd-related set of interests may become more decisive in 
calculating what narrative of legitimacy should survive. It was cable news and the 
CNN effect that was the first systematic shock to an earlier system of managing 
the production and distribution of strategic narratives. Steven Livingston, among 
others, documented ways in which traditional diplomatic interchanges were modi-
fied by the capacity of new networks to disrupt old practices.25
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22 The internet, social media, cellphones, satellites —all of these now insistently 
affect how narratives, especially international strategic narratives, evolve and what 
constitutes their life cycle—. Narratives, both domestic and international, are more 
vulnerable because of the potential volatility of extraordinarily passionate entrants 
who use new technologies to alter the rhythm of accepted approaches.26 The received 
wisdom is subject to challenge. Deviations from accuracy —real or imagined— are 
challenged by crowd-sourced material and citizen journalists. The existence of secret 
or discreet agreements to a strategic narrative is more likely to be uncovered and pu-
blicized. And competing narratives —ones that represent a more compelling myth, a 
more impressive group of key players and a different concatenation of power— can 
be produced and rendered viral instantly. As a result, the stability or half-life of a 
reigning narrative may become shorter and shorter. An international narrative that 
is out of sync with facts on the ground is always susceptible. But the increased pene-
tration and use of social media makes this lack of synchronicity particularly salient. 
One could posit several subcategories: where the local socially-mediated rea-
lity is congruent with the strategic narrative being propounded internationally 
(Tahrir Square), strongly inconsistent with its international counterpart (occa-
sional reflections on the reality of Libyan rebel forces), or divided. One can de-
marcate areas where social media are relatively passive or deeply active. Such 
examination is an element in understanding the process of interaction between 
social media and strategic narratives. For much of the world, the lesson from the 
Arab Spring is the hopeful one of democratization. For those in power, and not 
only those in repressive regimes, the message is more complex. Social media shifts 
power, speeds mobilization, decentralizes leadership, unifies across class —or at 
least has this potential—. From the perspective of security, this combination of 
strategic communication from abroad and social media within can be particu-
larly toxic. Tyrants as well as protestors will examine these questions closely. 
New variables that gain significance include the extent of social media activity 
—if penetration and use are acting in a way that alters local networks and that 
connects local agents for change with others (diasporic allies, non-governmental 
organizations, and governmental supporters abroad)—.
Another related variable is whether the social media platforms are highly con-
tested—whether complexity in establishing a strategic narrative globally reflects 
deep divisions that reach into the representation of events in social media (lea-
ving aside whether those divisions are overrepresented or underrepresented in 
the social media as opposed to the physical world). A grid could be constructed 
that shows, by country, the intensity of use of social and the extent to which 
there are meaningfully competing narratives being represented. Such an analysis 
could also evaluate the success of the government or the state in shaping access 
to social media as a means of affecting the narrative of legitimacy. 
I suggested above three models for legitimating strategic narratives: consen-
sus, power and charisma. One can begin to ask —though a systematic scheme 
cannot be yet undertaken— for each of the states involved in the Arab Spring,27 
questions like these: a) Was there a settled narrative that came to meet one of the 
three categories of potentially viable accounts (consensus supported, superpower 
supported or charismatic)?; b) Can one describe what stage in the strategic nar-
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rative process was involved: formation, application, regression?; c) How did the 
new communications technologies and social media affect the formation and 
application of the strategic narrative?; and, finally, d) has the strategic narrative 
in some articulable way “succeeded” or “failed” in its application? 
One must also understand how social media affects the relationship bet-
ween the different types of strategic narrative. Tunisia, as the first, seemingly 
spontaneous event, which came to fruition quickly, established a dominant 
new narrative that became the default approach in the rapidly-arising successor 
protests in Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria and elsewhere. But what appeared to 
be the defining narrative did not rise, in each instance, to strategic status or do 
so immediately. After Tunisia, and certainly after Egypt, it became increasingly 
difficult for key actors to reach agreement on an aspirational narrative. The 
capacity of the narrative itself to cause a binding script on key actors could 
therefore not be easily realized. Power and lack of consensus among significant 
partners meant the voices on the street could not be harmonized an put into 
the service of a unified vision. 
An understanding must also draw on social media’s relationship with other 
forms of mass communication, which still have undoubted influence. The rela-
tionship between social media and the traditional broadcast media is complex, 
and the loop or progression analysis of the perceptive observer (and impor-
tant participant in the Tunisian revolution), Sami Ben Gharbia, is compelling.28 
Ben Gharbia proposes a three-part model (drawing on the case of Tunisia) that 
“treats social media as part of a... complex ecosystem,” involving Facebook as a 
publishing platform, multiple curation platforms (Nawaat, Global Voices, Twit-
ter, Posterous), and eventually broadcast platforms (Al Jazeera and France24 
among others). Sites like Nawaat identified content posted on Facebook, tagged 
and categorized it and made it accessible to other media organizations, parti-
cularly Al Jazeera. Then the loop or interaction began. “Once content made 
it onto Al Jazeera, it began filtering back into Tunisia, letting Tunisians who 
weren’t looking for content online understand what was unfolding.” Al Jazee-
ra “became an extension of the internet, publishing user-generated content 
and using it to educate Tunisian citizens about what was going on in their 
own country, and eventually the whole region.” According to Ben Gharbia, this 
three-part model created an information cascade that was instrumental in has-
tening the revolution. Thus we see that informed analysis led to a much more 
complex understanding of the dynamics of the situation —with social media 
interacting with old forms of media and politics to synthesize new ones, rather 
than simply usurping what went before.
In the Tunisia case —given its suddenness— the strategic narrative trailed 
the social media, indeed, may be said to have followed and mirrored it. In 
Syria and Bahrain there was more interaction, where players with a stake in 
the strategic narrative sought to affect the social media space because of its 
generative capacity. In a way the Ben Gharbia model —reflecting the Tunisia 
case— would be expanded. The loop would include international actors see-
king to influence the blogosphere, with reverberations into the curation sites 
and ultimately returning to Al Jazeera or other effective international media 
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24 (such as CNN or BBC World Service’s World Have Your Say). This then would 
feed both into the international sphere and the local blogosphere —the two 
audiences interacting—.
In Bahrain, where social media use is high, the blogosphere reflected the in-
tense division of perspectives on how to characterize events —a division that 
was partly spontaneous, and partly an orchestrated effort by all sides to produce 
an internal narrative with implications on how Bahrain and its protests would 
be perceived in capitals of the world—.29 In the early days of the Syria protests, 
where efforts existed to seal what was occurring from foreign reporting, it was so-
cial media risk takers who provided rare insight into occurrences —a system that 
then matured—. Accounts in The New York Times and The Guardian emphasized 
the ingenuity of Syrian supporters of protests to enrich the social media space:
Among unprecedented and growing protests against the 41-year dictatorship of the As-
sad family over Syria, social media mavens such as Nakhle are emerging as the thread 
that binds disparate protests together. Foreign media have been all but barred from re-
porting from Syria and dozens of local and Arab journalists have been arrested or ex-
pelled. In their place, Syria’s cyber activists are using social media and technology to 
ensure reporting gets out, linking the protesters on the street with the eyes and ears of 
the world.30
Analysis of the social media demonstrate that there were two (at least two) au-
diences for those seeking to embed a narrative. The world was fixated on the 
celebration of the emerging narrative in Tahrir Square, or in the protests in Syria 
or Bahrain or Yemen. That is the most notorious audience. But for strategic narra-
tives of international importance, there is also the home audience of the major 
powers where populations are called upon to support, finance and enforce the 
playing out of a narrative. A narrative for Libya and Egypt, one determined in 
international capitals, had to resonate with the political desires of populations 
in the UK or the United States or France. Political leaders had to persuade their 
constituents and shape an account that brought them gently into the frame. But 
the key actors for whom these narratives constitute a script obviously include the 
authorities in the target society, as we have seen with Mubarak and young Gadda-
fi. Indeed, they are the actors who are to be brought to heel, if possible, who are 
subject to the hoped-for binding nature of the narrative, who are to be persuaded 
to follow an international script. And it is here that the implications of social me-
dia become central. Enforcing the global narrative against the local central actors 
presents significant barriers if, in an intensely socially mediated world, the local 
socially mediated reality is strongly inconsistent with its international counter-
part, relatively passive, or strongly divided. An internationally-forged strategic 
narrative may, and possibly should, lose credibility if it is inconsistent with on 
the ground opinion (as manifested through social media and other channels), 
and a divided and conflicting narrative loses the benefit of reinforcement and ex-
pansive network effects. It is the power of social media actually to challenge the 
power of the West’s unilateral ability to impose strategic narratives and to allow 
domestic audiences to take the lead or a greater role in some situations.
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the compLexity of reLiaNce oN strategic Narratives
In terms of “anxieties,” one can see the relationship between narratives of le-
gitimacy on the one hand and reaction of authority on the other. Throughout 
the Arab Spring, the exercise of narrative power by the West —announcements, 
letters, emissaries— were met by rejection and contempt by the then-in-power 
leaders to whom they were addressed. The issue of arriving at a narrative that has 
staying power has to do, as well, with the problems I have already highlighted 
—ones of forming and implementing the narrative and protecting against back-
sliding. Even when there were attempts to fall in line, resentment was not far 
beneath the surface. And throughout, in reaction to the narratives of democracy 
propounded, a spate of counter-efforts were attempted. In Libya, for example, 
circumstances on the ground and in the air were constantly rubbing against the 
accepted narrative. It was increasingly unclear whether the cost of fidelity to the 
narrative was too high for otherwise strained U.S. or European participants.
Syria presented another example of complexity concerning the strategic nar-
rative where the international consensus has taken a long time to coalesce, if 
coalescence ever occurs, and bitter hostility and refusal to bend seemed to cha-
racterize the actions of Assad. The threat of such an imposed understanding is 
there, however. In Egypt, the international consensus almost immediately (with 
notable exceptions and some slight delays) was for Mubarak to depart, with the 
Egyptian military rapidly concurring. In Syria, it took months for the internatio-
nal community to agree (and it had not yet at the time of this version) on how 
or whether Assad was required to step down. The crises in drafting a resolution 
at the UN Security Council showed the waning momentum to shape a unifying 
strategic narrative.
There are several traps in the invocation of “strategic narratives” in the account 
of international policy decisions, even in the narrower framework of the episodes 
I have discussed. First there is the problem of overbreadth. It is hard to distinguish 
between narrative and strategic narrative. I have suggested that a distinction, for 
me, lies in the disciplining or potentially binding nature by which the narrative 
operates. But here too, as I have pointed out, there is a fragility. Where they exist, 
strategic narratives are tenuous, as is their capacity, even their potential, for gui-
ding and controlling conduct. It is difficult to evaluate what disciplining power 
can be attributed to the narrative itself, as compared to the power structures that 
underlie it. And it would be useful to see how strategic narratives affect public opi-
nion, both in the target society and at home. The important role of the militaries 
in deciding the outcome of Arab Spring protests is indicative of the confusion here 
—the interaction between the word and the bullet is not always easy to examine—. 
As to each of the states involved, we can ask these questions: is there a settled na-
rrative that meets one of the three categories (consensus supported, superpower 
supported or charismatic); what stage in the strategic narrative process is involved: 
formation, application, regression; how do communications technologies affect 
the formation and application of the strategic narrative; has a strategic narrative 
“failed” in its application. Since circumstances change, it is difficult to comment 
on these variables. We have seen that what appears to be a suitable characteriza-
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26 tion at one point, alters at another. Tunisia, as the first, seemingly spontaneous 
event, which came to fruition quickly, established a dominant new narrative that 
became the default approach in the rapidly arising successor protests in Egypt, Ye-
men, Bahrain, Syria and elsewhere). But what appeared to be the defining narrative 
did not rise, in each instance, to strategic status or do so immediately. After Egypt, 
it was more difficult, even, at first, in the case of Libya, to reach agreement of key 
actors for the aspirational narrative. The capacity of the narrative itself to cause a 
binding script on key actors —could not easily be realized. Power and lack of con-
sensus among significant partners meant—.
Illustrations beyond the “Arab Spring” are legion and significant. Take the 
strategic narrative that accompanied the decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003 
concerning the presence in Iraq of weapons of mass destruction.31 The narrative 
was strategic because it bound sufficient international players for key moments 
in time. It was effective because the key players actually performed for the time 
necessary for elements of the narrative to be achieved. Again, it had elements 
of the three categories I have described above: agreement, exercise of power, 
and what seemed to be a sufficiently compelling story to adequately enlist and 
carry public opinion. In some ways, the fact that the narrative was not based on 
actual facts merely illustrates the significance of the narrative independent of 
reality. One could argue that the years of seeking a “solution” to the Middle East 
peace process were exercises in successive efforts at developing a strategic narra-
tive, as well as at demonstrating the powers and the limits of such efforts. The 
Oslo Accords, the Camp David Agreements, and any number of “roadmaps” all 
are preceded by or reflect narratives that provide the environment for formally 
and explicitly binding documents. Strategic narratives included “land for peace,” 
or movement towards a two-state solution. They were about a grand picture in 
which the actors would enact certain set roles on a determined trajectory. To fo-
llow the categories outlined above, the strategic narrative misfired, as key parties 
withdrew, as the power basis for the agreement collapses, or if the narrative was 
not sufficiently compelling to keep all parties at the table.32
Strategic narratives are not just the product of vast changes in the global 
information environment. They are not, necessarily, the products of the kinds 
of transnational efforts by one state to alter the media space of another. They 
are not dependent, though they may be affected, by the rise of social media in a 
particular context. A strategic narrative can be destabilizing as well as stabilizing, 
reshaping as well as unifying. The construction of the narrative can and does be-
come a matter of great state interest. Control of information by the elites has had 
overwhelming significance in shaping these narratives. Yet, the crowds in Tahrir 
Square in Egypt, or those in Yemen and Syria, demanded a say in the strategic 
narrative that would arise from multilateral negotiations. They became a Fifth 
Estate —asserting their own authority, and seeking to become at least an equal 
in terms of bargaining over the way the future would be defined—. If narratives 
have this power, then the continuing process of producing them bears scrutiny.
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